[vinman]

Quote:

A once-promising strategy for stability in Afghanistan ended badly two years ago, along with the career of its author and chief proponent, Army Special Forces Maj. Jim Gant. His gripping story is detailed in a new book, American Spartan, by Ann Scott Tyson, the former Washington Post war correspondent who interviewed him for an admiring story in late 2009. They fell in love. Tyson eventually joined Gant in an Afghan village, where he built a reputation mobilizing local tribes against the Taliban.

A tough, wiry Special Forces soldier, Gant was decorated and recommended for promotion over 22 continuous months of combat in Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011. But in the end, the iconoclasm and disdain for military protocol that enabled Gant’s success were instrumental in his eventual downfall.

At his peak, Gant, now 46, posed such a threat to al Qaeda’s objectives that Osama bin Laden personally demanded his head, Tyson writes. Gant's lows came later, when he was accused by the military command of drinking and other violations, including keeping a "paramour,” and using tactics that recklessly endangered the lives of his troops. At the heart of the military's discomfort, Gant believes, was his insistence that he could trust his life, and those of his men, to the tribal Afghan fighters he'd trained and armed to reverse the Taliban’s spread across eastern Afghanistan.

To reach these tribes, Gant took a few seasoned Special Forces warriors "downrange," deep into rural communities where the Taliban held sway. He spent hours drinking tea and listening to village elders. He and his men grew beards. They wore Afghan clothing and learned to speak Pashto. They trained and armed village tribesmen and pledged their lives to one another. In the nonconformist tradition of the Green Berets, Gant shrugged away the U.S. military bureaucracy, with its thickets of regulations, codified as official Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Among them: rules for specific combat operations that dictate the number of troops, types of vehicles and types of weapons used -- requirements often ignored by Special Forces teams, and especially by Gant.

Soon, Gant's teams of Green Berets and Afghans -- the beginning of what is known today as the Afghan Local Police (ALP) -- were operating against the Taliban together. His methods were risky -- Gant said he once drove with his team into a Taliban stronghold, dared them to attack, then stole their white flag when they refused. Sometimes, he said, he convinced Taliban fighters to join the local forces.

In Afghanistan, commanders allowed him the unusual freedom to operate as he saw fit. He was considered by then-Gen. David Petraeus and other top military commanders to be one of the leading counterinsurgency experts in the American military.

But his unconventional tactics and flouting of the rules eventually proved too much. In the spring of 2012, Gant was abruptly fired, stripped of his prized Special Forces insignia and forced into humiliating retirement. His work fell into disrepair.

Gant and Tyson, now married, expanded on their story in hours of exclusive interviews with The Huffington Post.

Gant's introduction to Afghanistan came in 2003 and 2004, when he led a hunter-killer team and began to develop his ideas on arming and fighting alongside local tribes against the Taliban. He was sent next to Iraq, where he served two bloody tours, leading a U.S.-Iraqi commando team. Gant was awarded the prestigious Silver Star for gallantry in action, after an extended firefight in which he deliberately drove over and detonated three IEDs to protect his troops behind him. Back in the states as a Special Forces instructor, he began to realize that the killing wasn't working.

"I am in a group of outliers that really, really, really enjoyed combat, to include killing -- to hunt another human being down and shoot him in the face," Gant told me. "But if all you're doing is killing, and you're not gaining security, something is wrong. You have to relook [at] what it is that you're doing."

"War is not passing out candy," Gant said. "You're gonna have to kill. But … at some point you have to do something different."

He knew that local tribes were Afghanistan's political, cultural and social center, built on intense loyalty to brother warriors, family and village, and a willingness to die to protect them from outsiders -- Taliban, Americans or the central government in Kabul. The tribal fighters offered, and demanded, respect, loyalty and honor.

Rather than propping up a weak and corrupt central government, Gant thought, the U.S. should be working bottom up: building trust with the tribes, then providing the pay and weapons for their own self-defense.

It was a bold concept. He detailed it in a paper, "One Tribe at a Time," which went online in the fall of 2009. The idea of using local manpower for security had been around for a while, but without a champion. Gant's proposal was an immediate hit in Washington: the Obama administration was searching for a way to win the war it had inherited in Afghanistan.

Pentagon brass were pressing for huge troop reinforcements. But Gant was pushing a low-cost and speedy solution, using Special Forces teams of Green Berets.

"In a situation where you're working feverishly to accelerate the development of the host nation capabilities -- and we knew there was a limited amount of time -- we had to get on with it, and this was one of the few ways we could get on with it," said a former senior commander in Afghanistan. He spoke on condition that he not be identified because of the lingering official sensitivity about Gant's career.

Inserting small Green Beret teams deep into remote villages, far from reinforcements, would be risky, Gant realized. "American soldiers would die, some of them alone, with no support," he wrote in the paper. "Some may simply disappear. Everyone has to understand that from the outset."

But, he observed, "We are losing in Afghanistan."

His ideas caught the attention of two powerful four-star officers: Adm. Eric Olson, then head of the Special Operations Command, and Gen. David Petraeus, then commander of U.S. Central Command. In short order, Gant was back in Afghanistan to put his ideas into action in June 2010.

Working in insurgent-controlled valleys in Konar Province, Gant and his teams of American and Afghan fighters operated far beyond the reach of reinforcements or air support. Their own security: absolute trust that each would fight to the death for the others.

Tyson went with them. She took a leave of absence from The Washington Post in September 2010, and flew to Afghanistan, where she gathered material for the book. Under Gant's supervision, Tyson learned to fire "almost every weapon" the Special Forces team used, she writes. On missions with Gant and his team, she wore U.S. military fatigues and tucked her hair up under a ballcap. Her job in a firefight was to pass ammunition to the turret gunner.

They'd visit villages and listen respectfully to the elders' ideas -- a time-consuming tactic not always practiced by other American soldiers. Gant's own personality evidently pleased Afghan villagers: polite, engaging and a careful listener, he values honor above all else, and is quick to bestow his friendship and trust -- but equally quick to erupt in violence if warranted.

"They knew, from back in '03 and '04, that I had smoked a lot of people. And they knew I'd burn the whole frickin' place down,” Gant said. “But I'd also tell them, 'Hey -- I did not come to fight this time,' and I think that resonated with them."

Inevitably, they would encounter villagers who were fighting for the Taliban, and they'd talk. "I was more interested -- much more interested -- in talking to the Taliban than killing them," Gant said. On one mission, Gant and his men fought alongside an Afghan who had previously been a top Taliban commander. Like other defectors, his priority was to protect his home village turf, not to be part of an ideological movement directed from Pakistan.

Soon, officially sanctioned ALP units were forming across the country. In eastern Afghanistan by mid-2011, Gant and his teams had built ALP forces numbering some 1,300, up from zero the previous year, according to an official review in June 2011. Petraeus, then the senior military commander in Afghanistan, helicoptered in to award Gant an Army commendation medal for "exceptionally meritorious achievement" that enabled "the unprecedented advancement of the campaign in Afghanistan," the award citation states.

But trouble was brewing. Afghan President Hamid Karzai, concerned at the growing political clout of ALP commanders, seized control of the program and the U.S.-funded supplies for the ALP. Inevitably, Tyson writes, pay, fuel and ammunition intended for ALP units began to disappear inside the corrupt Afghan logistics system. Critics charged that the program was merely empowering vicious and untrustworthy warlords. There were accusations against some ALP units for human rights abuses.

The Special Forces command in Afghanistan, which often brought visiting brass and congressional delegations to admire Gant's operations, began to chafe at his bending of the rules, according to Tyson's account. Command started investigating Gant's lifestyle and his habit of thumbing his nose at official regulations, Tyson writes, including a prohibition on drinking and possession of painkillers, sleeping pills and other pharmaceuticals. He was accused of keeping a "paramour," a reference to Tyson. While their living arrangement was unusual, they argue in the book that her presence was a useful link to village women and helped cement ties between the Americans and the Afghans.

Gant also kept classified material in his room; it should have been kept "in a General Services Administration-approved security container and placed under continuous (i.e., 24/7) control by U.S. government personnel," according to a statement by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). To no avail, Gant responded to command that he kept drugs as the acting medic for his troops, and that there was nowhere else to store classified papers.

Asked whether it was common for Special Forces soldiers living in austere combat outposts to have access to alcohol, a USASOC spokesman, Lt. Col. Dave Connolly, wrote in a carefully worded email that soldiers are expected to obey the prohibition on alcohol and "are aware of the ramifications if caught."

Things got worse. Petraeus and other senior commanders who had supported Gant had gone home, Petraeus to take over the CIA. The commanders who remained, Gant said, resented his breaching of regulations and high-profile successes. On the basis of what Gant considers trumped-up charges of drinking, keeping drugs, living with Tyson and endangering the lives of his men due to his disregard for standard military procedure, in March 2012, Gant was plucked from his American and Afghan team and flown back to the states, where he received a severe, career-ending reprimand from Lt. Gen. John F. Mulholland, commander of the Army Special Operations Command. In a letter dated July 2012, Mulholland acknowledged Gant's "record of honorable and valorous service." But he said Gant's conduct had been "inexcusable and brought disrepute and shame to the Special Forces" and "disgraced you as an officer and seriously compromised your character as a gentleman."

The village where Gant had based his operations was abandoned by the U.S. command.

Maj. Gant was demoted a rank, to captain, and then allowed to retire. His security clearances were revoked. But what stung the most, he said, was the humiliation and betrayal of the trust he'd built with the Afghans, and his repudiation by senior Special Operations commanders, of whom he speaks bitterly. He feels he was railroaded out of the Green Berets by officers who valued by-the-book military procedure over successful warfighting.

"Yes, I broke those rules and I never say I didn't," Gant said, acknowledging that he drank and used sleeping pills and pain medication. "But I mean, we're not talking rape, murder, stealing property. I went to the extremes to protect my men. I loved them every day. I never lost a man. I'm proud. I can look in the mirror. If I went back and did it again, not one thing would I change."

Mulholland, now head of the U.S. Special Operations Command, declined to comment, through a spokesman.

Gant's work, while controversial, is still held as exemplary in many parts of the military. His operations "played a pivotal role in stabilizing …. an area that until very recently was under insurgent control," a superior wrote in June 2011. "His unprecedented success … has had a strategic impact on our operations in Afghanistan."

"We needed Special Forces to be intrepid, to take risks, to feel that some rules didn't apply to them," the former senior commander in Afghanistan told me. "His strength, the strength of a lot of guys in those environments, was their willingness to push the envelope of the bureaucracy, to live with much less protection.

"But at the end of the day, it appears that he broke quite a few rules that shouldn't have been broken.” Gant, this commander said, "felt he was exempt."

Thus was lost a promising initiative, one that might have matured into an inexpensive and self-sustaining movement to enable Afghans to help stabilize their own country. Gant's dramatic rise and fall calls into question whether even the Special Forces -- expected to excel in unconventional warfare -- can ever operate effectively in tricky conflicts like Afghanistan, where strict U.S. military procedures may not fit the environment or leave any room for rule-breaking mavericks.

In his 2009 paper, "One Tribe at a Time," Gant wrote that his gravest concern was that once his ideas were adopted and good relations were established with the Afghans, the U.S. would then abandon them and the ALP units. "By far the worst outcome we could have," he wrote, is that "the tribes to whom we have promised long-term support will be left to be massacred by a vengeful Taliban."

The latter has not happened, at least on a large scale.

Today in Afghanistan, there are close to 27,000 ALP in 29 of the country's 34 districts, according to Army Lt. Col James O. Gregory, a spokesman for the Special Operations Joint Task force in Afghanistan. But with the drawdown of U.S. troops and a withdrawal deadline at the end of this year, "few" Green Beret teams are embedded at the village level, Gregory said.

In cases where ALP positions have been overrun by the Taliban, Gregory wrote in an email, "they have the ability to call for direct assistance from neighboring [Afghan National Army] and [Afghan National Police] if needed."

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/24...08520.html

[Samseau]

Good story. Reminds me of the quote, "There's the right way, the wrong way, and the military's way." Stifling beuracracy has no place in the military, which demands constant improv tactics during the ever changing conditions of the battlefield. Instead our military is more concerned with letting in gays and women rather than winning battles. This is what the death of an empire looks like, fellas.

[spalex]

A good read, something different to what you would usually read about coming out of that area.

After I read the first few paragraphs my first thought were; Only the fucken incompetent, retarded American cowboys would be able to do that.
Any other army would have you picked up and shipped home immediately for attempting something like that without approval (which could take years to get).

When I was over there, I seen one of our special forces guys get sent home and discharged for stealing contraband from a dead body (it was only his hat).

It does seem a little strange that he was allowed to do this on his own with what seems to be little to no planning.
But I would be interested in reading more about it.

[RexImperator]

Interesting read. I think this is a microcosm of what's happening in America generally, where it's becoming more important to follow petty rules to a T than to exercise judgement and do what's right.

[DonRoberto]

(03-24-2014 02:00 PM)Samseau Wrote:  

Good story. Reminds me of the quote, "There's the right way, the wrong way, and the military's way." Stifling beuracracy has no place in the military, which demands constant improv tactics during the ever changing conditions of the battlefield. Instead our military is more concerned with letting in gays and women rather than winning battles. This is what the death of an empire looks like, fellas.

Having a slight bit of experience and knowledge of these things, what you say is quite correct. There has been a massive disconnect in anglophone military culture/doctrine for leadership over the past twenty years. On the one hand, you hear how individual initiative, enterprising junior leadership, and flattening of hierarchies are more essential than ever in countering insurgencies. On the other, selection and training methods, in combination with modern communications meaning effectively constant supervision, have emasculated the decision making abilities of junior officers in favour of an almost Edwardian 'Yes Sir - No Sir - Three bags full Sir!' approach where initiative, when it hasn't been beaten out of people in training, is actively discouraged and marginalized.
At the other end, very senior officers jump at the ideas of politicians however stupid the ideas may be in hope of political appointments after retiring from the military, rather than counseling them with wisdom about what is and isn't achievable with the military and/or 'x' thousand troops.

This is why the British Army loses wars; anyone with bright ideas leaves after 3-5 years of frustration. I fear the US may go the same way.

[jamaicabound]

Very interesting story. I feel sorry for military guys today with these jacked up rules of engagement that basically turn you into a target who can't do anything. I remember hearing another story recently of a guy who warned a fellow squad leader of a Afghan police who had defected and working for taliban so he could have his men watch the guy and keep an eye on him and not trust him and be shot in the back. The guy was I believe court marshalled for trying to save marines because he didn't go through the proper channels. I think the thing was he sent an email from his personal email vs a gov encrypted one. He actually realized his own mistake and reported himself and still got booted I believe. I think Oreilly or someone was trying to raise awareness of his case.

[TonySandos]

Amazing man. You could weep over the pointless loss and almost guaranteed failure of the Afghan war from Maj. Gant's story and the countless others like it. The worst part is I know we have the means to easily win an asymmetrical war like this, but the politics hinder too much.

Generals and other high ranking members cower at politicians in nearly every council instead of advising them. The congressional majority is ineptly uninformed on military matters. It also painfully seems like the most left-leaning individual want to see the military be wounded for God knows what reason. I often wonder why they hate us so much in such a general sense.

I've seen many people on this forum say it, but there is no such thing as saying it too many times. Do not join the US military. Even at the highest levels, an able-bodied and highly intelligent man will still find himself unnecessarily put in danger or grossly slandered.

[Suits]

Living with a woman while at a combat post is a pretty serious offense. If the top commanding officers do this, why can't lower level operators do it?

It creates the potential for a while bunch of problems.

Really, men shouldn't be expected to go forever without experience a feminine touch. I think that women should be allowed in the military...as volunteer concubine units.

But until that happens, one can't really expect that brass to turn a blind eye to fragrant violations of standard policies.

[TonySandos]

As far as the no nonsense demeanor of SF goes, I think they handled it appropriately with their leader. Petty jealous or inane things happening? I think they likely saw her use. While not very professional to bring your girlfriend on ops, his results argue in his favor.

[MHaes]

(03-24-2014 02:06 PM)spalex Wrote:  

After I read the first few paragraphs my first thought were; Only the fucken incompetent, retarded American cowboys would be able to do that.
Any other army would have you picked up and shipped home immediately for attempting something like that without approval (which could take years to get).

Yeah, our "fucken incompetent retards" just happen to be the best soldiers on the planet. So what does that make your service members?

[General Mayhem]

Things like this are what make me question my future as an officer.

[Suits]

(03-24-2014 03:29 PM)MHaes Wrote:  

(03-24-2014 02:06 PM)spalex Wrote:  

After I read the first few paragraphs my first thought were; Only the fucken incompetent, retarded American cowboys would be able to do that.
Any other army would have you picked up and shipped home immediately for attempting something like that without approval (which could take years to get).

Yeah, our "fucken incompetent retards" just happen to be the best soldiers on the planet. So what does that make your service members?

[TonySandos]

[Sharky Jackson]

(03-24-2014 02:00 PM)Samseau Wrote:  

Stifling bureaucracy has no place in the military,

Can you name a modern military that is not, itself, a stifling bureaucracy?

[Quintus Curtius]

I'm not so sure about the narrative on this officer.

Brilliant? I'm sure.
Innovative? I'm sure.

But the bottom line is that nobody can flout the rules openly like that. If he got cashiered, you can be sure that he got plenty of warnings.

Messing with classified info, fraternizing with women in combat zones, and disobedience to orders are not going to endear an officer to his superiors.

Not much sympathy from me on this one.

[Sawyer]

Kurtz reborn.

"I wanted another mission, and for my sins, they gave me one."

Merka… FUKC YEAH!

[Sp5]

I've been around SF. Their virtues are also their faults. For example, they have a culture of resourcefulness which includes ripping off things from the regular military or anyone else. I mean stealing equipment, not for personal use, but for the mission. The ripping off is treated as a training mission for stealth break-ins. This is a part of their resourcefulness, but it is a pain in the ass for the accountable officer or NCO in the unit that gets stolen from.

Drug use can also be a feature. Medics serving SF have told me about their liberal use of stimulants and hypnotics. It's not surprising when you have to do night missions, but it is self-prescribing of controlled substances. The painkiller thing does not surprise me, the work takes a toll and a lot of SF are broke down by age 35. Of course, we are not talking ibuprofin or aspirin here.

The drinking thing is just piling on - SF just did not give a shit about "General Order One" banning alcohol. Having the girlfriend around is a bit bizarre.

Maybe they should have pulled this guy out of theater and given him a job teaching at JFK Special Warfare Center at Ft. Bragg for awhile to let him rest and recoup, not shitcan him.

Someone's gotta remake Apocalypse Now set in Afghanistan or Iraq, this story could be a base. There is a bit of Col. Kurtz in this Maj. Gant.

[Walderschmidt]

(03-24-2014 01:47 PM)vinman Wrote:  

Quote:

"They knew, from back in '03 and '04, that I had smoked a lot of people. And they knew I'd burn the whole frickin' place down,” Gant said. “But I'd also tell them, 'Hey -- I did not come to fight this time,' and I think that resonated with them."

That's why they were interested in talking to him [this time].

Same with why women want to marry players and men of experience.

Wald

[Btbob]

OK, without saying too much: The article is slanted almost dishonestly towards Gant's side of the story.

One tribe at a time was a seminal piece in the community and helped lead to the VSO program. I don't want to take anything away from Gant, his concepts, or his contributions.

However, he knowingly violated OPSEC. With a reporter no less. Shit like that gets people killed. While everyone wants to point out how he's getting railroaded that little bit gets glossed over. I don't even care so much about the flagrant violations of G.O. 1 (seriously though, it's not hard to keep under wraps). OPSEC exists for a reason.

Another facet that is overlooked by the article is the political landscape regarding US policy towards Afghanistan has shifted in the past few years. 2012 wasn't 2010 wasn't 2001. As the control of the war shifted from SOF control to GPF you see the stricter controls taking place. While this will stifle creativity it is less risky, something the current administration has placed at the forefront.

[Quintus Curtius]

(03-24-2014 10:24 PM)Btbob Wrote:  

OK, without saying too much: The article is slanted almost dishonestly towards Gant's side of the story.

One tribe at a time was a seminal piece in the community and helped lead to the VSO program. I don't want to take anything away from Gant, his concepts, or his contributions.

However, he knowingly violated OPSEC. With a reporter no less. Shit like that gets people killed. While everyone wants to point out how he's getting railroaded that little bit gets glossed over. I don't even care so much about the flagrant violations of G.O. 1 (seriously though, it's not hard to keep under wraps). OPSEC exists for a reason.

Another facet that is overlooked by the article is the political landscape regarding US policy towards Afghanistan has shifted in the past few years. 2012 wasn't 2010 wasn't 2001. As the control of the war shifted from SOF control to GPF you see the stricter controls taking place. While this will stifle creativity it is less risky, something the current administration has placed at the forefront.

I agree.

I'll even go one further. My gut feeling is that this guy is trying to rationalize having been relieved of command by trying to come off like some sort of maverick, snake-eating Dick Marcinko.

I say bullshit.

You fuck up in a combat zone and you're on your way back home. Going rogue, thumbing your nose at SOP (standard op procedures), and especially jacking with classified info is not going to cut it.

Maybe he was a good operator at one time. But he lacked discipline. If I were his CO, I would have relieved him also.

[Btbob]

(03-24-2014 09:57 PM)Sp5 Wrote:  

...which includes ripping off things from the regular military or anyone else. I mean stealing equipment, not for personal use, but for the mission....

...liberal use of stimulants and hypnotics. It's not surprising when you have to do night missions, but it is self-prescribing of controlled substances....

While that was more a thing of the past, shady shit has happened in contemporary times. Its discouraged as GPF are the key enablers for many SOF operations.

Yeah, I heard of Modafinil from a junior SF medic years before I heard of it through this community. A lot of them have spent extensive time on pain killers. They've all been either shot or blown up and some shit you never really recover from. A lot near retirement are on TRT too. The years spent with constant fight or flight hormone dumps takes a toll.

[Btbob]

(03-24-2014 10:29 PM)Quintus Curtius Wrote:  

I agree.

I'll even go one further. My gut feeling is that this guy is trying to rationalize having been relieved of command by trying to come off like some sort of maverick, snake-eating Dick Marcinko.

I say bullshit.

You fuck up in a combat zone and you're on your way back home. Going rogue, thumbing your nose at SOP (standard op procedures), and especially jacking with classified info is not going to cut it.

Maybe he was a good operator at one time. But he lacked discipline. If I were his CO, I would have relieved him also.

Exactly, I'm not saying he didn't do some great shit. But its a community where one fuck up can be your last. Nobody gets special treatment. If you want to be a rockstar join the SEALs, write some books and be in some goddamn movies.

[Sawyer]

(03-24-2014 10:32 PM)Btbob Wrote:  

(03-24-2014 10:29 PM)Quintus Curtius Wrote:  

I agree.

I'll even go one further. My gut feeling is that this guy is trying to rationalize having been relieved of command by trying to come off like some sort of maverick, snake-eating Dick Marcinko.

I say bullshit.

You fuck up in a combat zone and you're on your way back home. Going rogue, thumbing your nose at SOP (standard op procedures), and especially jacking with classified info is not going to cut it.

Maybe he was a good operator at one time. But he lacked discipline. If I were his CO, I would have relieved him also.

Exactly, I'm not saying he didn't do some great shit. But its a community where one fuck up can be your last. Nobody gets special treatment. If you want to be a rockstar join the SEALs, write some books and be in some goddamn movies.

But for God sakes don't win a war, right? The real problem was that he took purposely unactionable objectives and made them actionable, as all true warriors will. He took his job too seriously.

Isn't the takeaway that if you want to be a warrior the last place you want to be is in the US military?

[Btbob]

(03-24-2014 10:43 PM)Sawyer Wrote:  

(03-24-2014 10:32 PM)Btbob Wrote:  

(03-24-2014 10:29 PM)Quintus Curtius Wrote:  

I agree.

I'll even go one further. My gut feeling is that this guy is trying to rationalize having been relieved of command by trying to come off like some sort of maverick, snake-eating Dick Marcinko.

I say bullshit.

You fuck up in a combat zone and you're on your way back home. Going rogue, thumbing your nose at SOP (standard op procedures), and especially jacking with classified info is not going to cut it.

Maybe he was a good operator at one time. But he lacked discipline. If I were his CO, I would have relieved him also.

Exactly, I'm not saying he didn't do some great shit. But its a community where one fuck up can be your last. Nobody gets special treatment. If you want to be a rockstar join the SEALs, write some books and be in some goddamn movies.

But for God sakes don't win a war, right? The real problem was that he took purposely unactionable objectives and made them actionable, as all true warriors will. He took his job too seriously.

Isn't the takeaway that if you want to be a warrior the last place you want to be is in the US military?

Define "winning" in Afghanistan. The area Gant was at is ethnically similar to some other areas along the Af-Pak border. You want to see an officer that actually accomplished something google "Maj Mike Hutchinson". Kinda a wierdo, but fucking brilliant officer who didn't operate like a 17 year old kid whose parents left town.

And yeah, sitting on the sidelines is always an option. While I don't agree with a lot of larger US military policy, if you want to affect things in far flung places sometimes you have to make that deal with the devil.

*edited because it came off snarky. Aint my style.

[Quintus Curtius]

^^

@Sawyer:

No, that isn't the takeaway.

The takeaway is that this guy had lost the edge and needed to go. Period.

You don't just go out there and do what you want. Doesn't work like that.

What's worse is that he goes crying to the press. The first thing you realize in the military is that the system is bigger than you.

I got no problem with a man who does what he's told. But when he doesn't, the machine breaks down. And when that happens, it's all over.