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Geo-politics and monetary connections.
02-07-2016, 03:44 AM
The term renminbi (RMB) is the name of the official currency of China. I translated it as the People´s Money, but someone more scholarly in Chinese may wish to chime in. The Yuan (literally round) is the basic unit of the renmimbi (and of former Chinese currencies), but is used to refer to the Chinese currency in general, it was historically a lump of silver. It is also sometimes colloquially called a kuai. The distinction is similar to the British Sterling and British Pound, or perhaps in a more colloquial fashion between the US Dollar and the Buck (slang for dollar). I mention this here as they can be used interchangeable and I will normally use Yuan because of its historic basis.
The Special drawing Right (SDR) is neither a currency, nor a claim on the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Rather, it is a potential claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members. The value of the SDR was initially (1969) defined as equivalent to 0.888671 grams of fine gold. This was also equivalent to one U.S. dollar. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 (and the beginning of the Petro-dollar), the SDR was redefined as a basket of currencies which will be US Dollar 41.73, Euro 30.93, Yen, Pound, Yuan 10.92 Yen 8.33, Pound 8.09 on October 1, 2016 after the Yuan is officially included. Although highly unlikely, I do not preclude the possibility that the inclusion of the Yuan will be changed. Interestingly, the value of the SDR in terms of U.S. dollar is determined daily and posted on the IMF’s website that includes the US dollar, which is circular. It is calculated as the sum of specific amounts of each basket currency valued in U.S. dollars, on the basis of exchange rates quoted at noon each day in the London market. The basic function of (SDR) is to provide stability on the world global scene and thus it consists of stable economies (which are in essence based on their bond markets). The IMF has two general criteria (and other sub-criteria) for SDR inclusion; 1) Share in global exports; 2) Free usable economy. Both are equally ambiguous and lack objectivity as do most rules of other global organizations.
In regard as to why the Chinese Yuan was added to the IMF, the official answer from the IMF, whose creation is actually tied to the Exchange Stabilization fund (ESF), is that the inclusion of the Yuan “will bring about a more robust international monetary and financial system which in turn will support the growth and stability of China and the global economy.” Supposedly the Chinese are loosening control over their currency. Foreign entities (to include multi-national corporations) were only allowed to buy a fixed number of Chinese government bonds. They will say it is to open up the Chinese markets to the world, it would allow capital to flow into the Chinese markets as foreign entities invest in Chinese companies.
If the US dollar loses part of its status as the global reserve currency, then some of this privilege would accrue to China rather than the U.S. Borrowing costs, most importantly for the United States (U.S.) Government, would go up, and it would be more difficult for the US Treasury through the Federal Reserve to intervene to prop up the value of the currency in a sustained fashion (see my previous posts regarding the ESF). This would in turn weaken the ability of the U.S. to deficit spend and the sustainability of existing debt. The U.S. ability to enforce financial sanctions on foreign governments that it would like to control/influence would also decrease.
The U.S. was fighting for years to keep Yuan out of the SDR for reasons previously stated (in this post and the last), so why did they accept the loss? Like all good warriors, to prevent a greater loss and try to manage a tactical retreat, or as we said in my military days, to advance in another direction. One of the current modes of the advance in another direction is with off-shore Chinese Yuan centers as they are not restricted as they are in mainland China (on-shore centers). Financial products exist in the off-shore centers that are not available in on-shore centers and the (pegged) currency exchange rate is close to that of the on-shore rate. Such products include Yuan swaps (a type of derivative) and Yuan forwards (another type of derivative where you buy or sell a certain amount of currency in the future for the agreed price at the present), then imagine when you have forwards on swaps (derivatives based on derivatives). This is part of what came to a head in 2007-2008 in the U.S.
Here is an example of a currency swap. This can be done by at individual, or an institutional (bank, central bank, financial organization) level with varying restrictions. At the start of a swap, central bank 1 sells a specified amount of currency A to central bank 2 in exchange for currency B at the prevailing market exchange rate. Central bank 1 agrees to buy back its currency at the same exchange rate on a specified future date. Central bank 1 then uses the currency B it has obtained through the swap to lend on to local banks or corporations. On the specified future date that the swap unwinds and the funds are returned, central bank 1, which requested activation of the swap, pays interest to central bank 2. Permanent swap lines, like the ones in place today, promote huge currency mismatches. Banks will expect their central banks to provide them with foreign currency if market stresses make this funding difficult to obtain in private markets, and those who lend to foreign banks will continue to do so in the expectation that, in a crisis, they will be repaid with funds borrowed from the central bank. The existence of swaps therefore makes restraints on banks’ reliance on short-term funding, and requirements that foreign banks hold high quality, liquid, local currency assets.
These assets include the AAA bonds of the various countries that may be involved in the swaps or various high quality derivate instruments. I hope that the circularity is apparent in this moral hazard as almost all financial products (to include currencies) that most people in the world have are tied together by packaging and selling debt instruments to investors, pension funds and insurance companies.
The Chinese have been establishing Yuan/Renmimbi trading hubs around the world to facilitate trade amongst various countries and China. This has nothing to do with currency trading rather it is the SETTLEMENT OF TRADE. Country 1 gives Country 2, X good and/or services. Country 2 gives Country 1, Y goods and/or services. The net value difference X minus Y gives one nation a trade surplus and the other nation a trade deficit. The trade surplus/deficit was settled in the 18th, 19th and first part of the 20th century in gold and the nations actually shipped the difference in gold bars at the end of the year (relatively speaking) via ships. In general, this changed in the 20th century and the dollar was used as the mechanism for trade (as the dollar was tied to gold and considered as good as gold); however, gold continued to be shipped often between nations and in 1968 national leaders such as Charles De Gaulle of France actually demanded the gold in place of US Dollars; and the world began to change.
These Chinese Yuan hubs will not deal in US dollars (in general), rather they will begin by using Yuan and the currency of the trading nation (which could be the US dollarl). This will then change to another (gold-backed-trade) note and the center of gravity of world trade will shift even further. As this trade system shifts, world-wide financial and currency changes of significant magnitude will follow. One of the first Yuan trading hubs was in Brazil, there has been a monumental fight between the London banking center and Frankfurt to control trading between Europe and China (I expect Frankfurt to be the ultimate winner and this will influence threads 3 and 4 with Europe turning east to Russia and China as major trading partners and the diminishing of NATO will accelerate. One can observe the beginning of threads 3 and 4 in Syria with NATO countries (France and Germany to include logistics support from the British) supporting Russian forces against (Langley) ISIL(S). A Yuan trading hub does not exist in the U.S.; however, a Yuan center is currently being developed on the west coast (I believe in Los Angeles). My understanding is that major Yuan trading hubs already exist in 33 countries and smaller exchanges exist in an additional 95 countries. The idea is to facilitate trade, not provide loans.
In Germany you have two major threads of power, one is industrial (old money) the other is political (new money) and there is friction between the two; in China you have a (more complex) dichotomy of power with less friction. We shall call it old (ancient) money (which influences political power) and new money (tied to current political power in general).
When you ask Qui Bono for the IMF, part of the answer is hidden. On the outer stage, for the IMF, another member is added to share the burden of international liquidity shortages; for the Chinese the cost of borrowing will be less (yet their debt is internal, not external like the US which has about 50% external debt). Chinese investors will perceive that the risk is decreased as more international bonds will be denominated in Yuan, the currency will be perceived as stronger and therefore the probability of dissent is decreased in the eyes of the central government.
On the new money side there are other deals being made with IMF related puppet string masters on issues such as digital currency, banking transparency, identity cards, data sharing, imposition of world-wide financial transaction tax to fund the IMF, and others. On the less than hidden side, China will continue to purchase some US treasury bonds while quietly selling/trading other US Treasuries at discrete windows and these bond sales will be further disguised by the US Treasury department, particularly by the ESF. Furthermore, China will continue to be given access to purchase and transport (to China) more western held gold. When that access and transfer ceases the center of gravity will change. Speculation; on the Ancient money side there is an allowance being made to allow these institutions to continue in their current form while concessions are made by world organizations and institutions that minimize generational losses that include, but are not limited to monetary (including gold) instruments. This last part is purposefully vague.
Yes, there is a striking pattern of countries whose politicians talk about or act on selling energy in currencies other than the dollar being invaded, or regime change being initiated. This is not by accident as it challenges the foundation of the US dominated petro-dollar system and hence US power. All five points I initially proposed are related. We are developing points 1 and 2 now (with a tie to threads 3 and 4). Some of the interconnections should become apparent. There are now over 30 countries that are trading oil and/or natural gas in a currency other than the US dollar; very often it is bi-lateral between the currencies of the trading nations. This week, China and Russia have begun another phase of their eventual $400 billion (notice how the dollar is used as the reference) deal of energy for Yuan/Ruble. Watch for Iran to ask for oil in Euros and then Saudi Arabia to begin to accept multiple currencies including the US Dollars. These will be pivotal events. China has created and is using its own rating agency and an alternative to the Swift financial transaction system (they have credit card transactions that are almost as great as that of both VISA and MasterCard combined) while Russia has also developed (but not using) an alternative to the Swift system.
If there is a petro-dollar system in place in the world, then it does not follow that the price of oil would be going down while the value of the dollar is increasing (on the USDX). If oil is going down in US dollar price, then the value of the dollar should be declining. Yet given that the value of the dollar is increasing and the price of oil is declining when the world-wide demand for oil has increased over the years, production is at a relative (world-wide) high, the amount of oil in surplus is a very small (usually 1-2%) and the amount of alternative energy supplies, although having increased, is small as a percentage. Something is amiss. As I mentioned on my previous bond post on why is the value of the dollar so high thread, the narrative does not match the facts. The ability to do a proper analysis is not possible because we are being lied to. Therefore, one must look to other elements that are not presented to the masses, but footprints of their existence can be seen. Or perhaps there is no petro-dollar system.
Three ancient empires are on the rise, the Chinese, the Russian, and the Persian. They are working together to combat dollar hegemony and have formed a Eurasian Trade Zone that is using energy as the primary lever.
As an initial tie to an eventual thread 5, I suggest that these types of scenarios have been war gammed over the years using super-computers.