[estraudi]

It IS an IQ problem. These airlines are stupid enough to purchase planes with equipment BOEING would not provide to them as it's patented and violates their own policy of providing all the good tech to non-american airlines or partner airlines in "safer" countries.

It's hard to explain the amount of certification, reference numbers, non-incident statements, FAA 8130 & EASA tags plus quality control measures that go into getting a plane on the tarmac. It's insane the procedures. I work as a airline component destributor & broker.
Half of these dipshit airlines and their partner "mechanic shops" don't even order their Boeing pilot yokes with the pre-flight checklist that COMES ATTACHED from the manufacturer(BOEING).
Even minus that crucial checklist these pilots and planes are still certified to fly.
I laugh every time one crashes because I know exactly how these cheap skate airlines cut corners on red tape, flight equipment, certification, faulty parts and pilot training.
You get what you pay for.

[estraudi]

Not to mention most of these cheap skate airlines or their shops email us(we prefer email so we have proof of their shady practices to get us off the hook on technicalities) wanting to purchase a BER(Beyond Economical Repair) or AR(As-Removed) part, because they are not certified, therefore are very cheap in comparison to new, serviceable or overhauled parts(which can safely be put on planes no questions asked).

We tell them this part cannot be certified and we have the incident statements and reason for removal to go along with the sale.
They say the same shit, "Oh we will send a certifier over there to have a look and issue a new certification granting permission for the part to be used on our aircraft".
All this for a junked out part worth maybe $300. They'd rather fly a certifier from their home country(room and board,rental car) to our location in Arizona rather than pay $15,000-$30,000 for the same part certified new, serviceable or overhauled.
The guy shows up, he charges$500- $4,000 to review and certify the new part and boom that's how a shitty airline gets ahold of unworthy parts.
Fucking certifier easily makes $250,000-400,000 a year doing this kinda shit.

[Handsome Creepy Eel]

Yes Estraudi, completely agree with you regarding cost-cutting and cheapskate airlines but here is the case:

NYT Wrote:

One of the optional upgrades, the angle of attack indicator, displays the readings of the two sensors. The other, called a disagree light, is activated if those sensors are at odds with one another.

NYT Wrote:

The three American airlines that bought the 737 Max each took a different approach to outfitting the cockpits.

American Airlines, which ordered 100 of the planes and has 24 in its fleet, bought both the angle of attack indicator and the disagree light, the company said.

Southwest Airlines, which ordered 280 of the planes and counts 36 in its fleet so far, had already purchased the disagree alert option, and it also installed an angle of attack indicator in a display mounted above the pilots’ heads. After the Lion Air crash, Southwest said it would modify its 737 Max fleet to place the angle of attack indicator on the pilots’ main computer screens.

United Airlines, which ordered 137 of the planes and has received 14, did not select the indicators or the disagree light. A United spokesman said the airline does not include the features because its pilots use other data to fly the plane.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/busin...harge.html

So let's assume you're a pilot for the best-outfitted American Airlines 737 Max and your angle of attack indicator suddenly shows your plane's angle rising and the plane stalling (whereas the reality is that it's just a faulty sensor and MCAS is actually starting to point the plane down). You also see the disagree light activate, indicating that you probably can't trust the angle of attack indicator. You conclude that the plane is actually pointed down and that you should point it up again.

You reach for the controls and begin pointing the plane upwards. MCAS, relying on its shitty single faulty sensor, overrides you and keeps pointing the plane down. You still don't know what the actual angle of attack is at the moment, but you're sure that you should increase it just to be safe and then you can keep exploring what the issue might be.

In reality, your attempts to increase it are still being overridden by the hidden system and the plane is going to crash within one minute.

At this point, the sensible thing to do would be to turn off MCAS, but you've never even been told that such a thing exists because according to Boeing this plane is completely the same as all other 737 planes, so you keep looking for other solutions or consulting the emergency handbook while fighting with the controls to keep the plane steady.

The plane crashes and everyone dies.

The end.
----------------------------------------
----------------------------------------
Can you please explain:
A) How will high IQ or expensive equipment help you against a hidden system determined to crash you?
B) Why is it justifiable for Boeing to place the pilots in such an unnecessarily precarious situation in the first place?

[Duke Main]

(03-22-2019 11:09 AM)Handsome Creepy Eel Wrote:  

Comments at Breitbart are in full denial, blaming crashes on "third world airlines" and "low IQ pilots". No way the precious Boeing could ever be at fault despite designing a flying deathtrap dependent on a single sensor to stay aloft.

IQ is for the right what racism is for the left - an infinite wellspring of excuses to avoid taking any personal responsibility.

It's not either/or. Boeing looks very negligent here, but third world airlines have poor safety records for reasons beyond the quality of the aircraft. And it's not "low IQ pilots," it's the overall system in which they're placed.

[Duke Main]

(03-22-2019 01:34 PM)Handsome Creepy Eel Wrote:  

----------------------------------------
Can you please explain:
A) How will high IQ or expensive equipment help you against a hidden system determined to crash you?
B) Why is it justifiable for Boeing to place the pilots in such an unnecessarily precarious situation in the first place?

A) Not IQ, but experience and training. If the aircraft is giving me unwanted trim inputs I don't care if it's MCAS or a fat passenger getting up to take a dump, my response is the same; switch off the stabilizer trim motor.
B) The poor design by Boeing is not justifiable but it is manageable.

[estraudi]

Higher IQ which I'm using maybe as a poor substitute for smarts, keenness, or aptitude could have really saved the pilot here.

I've sat in and operated the simulators(boeing & airbus) at our customers simulation labs where they train these pilots, perk of the job.

Alot of "quirks" are thrown at the pilots to test their aptitude not only for OPERATING the countless instruments needed to fly a plane but also their ability to IMPROVISE and use their god given instincts to take control of the plane. Someone with the ability to think outside the box, or whatever you call it, would have known to fly a plane perpendicular or parallel to the ground as needed until able to land safely.

The pilots just let this plane go down practically saying "fuck it we tried". Maybe that's a rough generalization.

Boeing outfits these planes to the tune of the customers wallet as well so there's that.

This incident strikes at the whole autonomous vehicle transition. Most people will fault the technology and not human error every single time. Evidence based studies show humans will ALWAYS blame the tech first.

Driving in the rain I can defeat traction control in my car when the wheels slip as I know how to steer and control it whilst modulating throttle, maintaining good vision and operation of the vehicle. Does it mean my traction sensors were wrong and it's their fault for cutting in and out as the computer told them when comparing X amount of inputs? No, I think it would be my fault to not turn it the fuck off and control that shit myself, ain't nobody got time for that. Teslas do this alot. A person was also killed in my state by an inept driver letting the car drive itself, the car didn't detect a woman walking her bike across the road at night and killed her.

Tech isn't fool proof and actual human operation is and will always be needed. I'm surprised Airbus doesn't have as many crashes since they're more tech heavy especially with Fly By Wire systems and modules modules modules. Humans defeating those systems would be hard.
The loss of such tremendous amounts of life is tragic, nonetheless.

[Leonard D Neubache]

(03-22-2019 05:07 PM)estraudi Wrote:  

...
Tech isn't fool proof and actual human operation is and will always be needed. I'm surprised Airbus doesn't have as many crashes since they're more tech heavy especially with Fly By Wire systems and modules modules modules. Humans defeating those systems would be hard.
The loss of such tremendous amounts of life is tragic, nonetheless.

The day a million glasses of scotch in pilot lounges across the globe were simultaneously clinked together in joy.

[Glaucon]

People forget that software is written by humans. You would not believe how horribly buggy enterprise softwares are, and it is getting worse. They are going to need more and more admins and dev to keep things alive.

I will never sit in an "self driving" car, let alone a plane.

[void]

(03-23-2019 02:31 AM)Glaucon Wrote:  

People forget that software is written by humans. You would not believe how horribly buggy enterprise softwares are, and it is getting worse. They are going to need more and more admins and dev to keep things alive.

I will never sit in an "self driving" car, let alone a plane.

I assume self driving cars will be more aware of their environment and have better reaction time, than idiots using their smartphone while driving. (seeing it every fucking day)
The good thing about self driving cars is, that the manufacturers will have to rely on direct marketing to the end-customer. It is rather easy to set foot inside a specific car model, or not.

[saner]

(03-22-2019 05:07 PM)estraudi Wrote:  

I'm surprised Airbus doesn't have as many crashes since they're more tech heavy especially with Fly By Wire systems and modules modules modules.

Airbus designed their planes that way from the start. A wholy integrated system from the start.

The 737 is a nearly 50 year old plane, based on older planes. The 'modern' controls were grafted in, piece by piece over the years. When the MAX was built several major kludges were used. Kind of like retrofitting and modifying a Morris Minor to be a modern luxury car with ABS, airbags, traction control......

[Aurini]

(03-22-2019 05:07 PM)estraudi Wrote:  

Higher IQ which I'm using maybe as a poor substitute for smarts, keenness, or aptitude could have really saved the pilot here.

I've sat in and operated the simulators(boeing & airbus) at our customers simulation labs where they train these pilots, perk of the job.

Alot of "quirks" are thrown at the pilots to test their aptitude not only for OPERATING the countless instruments needed to fly a plane but also their ability to IMPROVISE and use their god given instincts to take control of the plane. Someone with the ability to think outside the box, or whatever you call it, would have known to fly a plane perpendicular or parallel to the ground as needed until able to land safely.

The pilots just let this plane go down practically saying "fuck it we tried". Maybe that's a rough generalization.

Boeing outfits these planes to the tune of the customers wallet as well so there's that.

This incident strikes at the whole autonomous vehicle transition. Most people will fault the technology and not human error every single time. Evidence based studies show humans will ALWAYS blame the tech first.

Driving in the rain I can defeat traction control in my car when the wheels slip as I know how to steer and control it whilst modulating throttle, maintaining good vision and operation of the vehicle. Does it mean my traction sensors were wrong and it's their fault for cutting in and out as the computer told them when comparing X amount of inputs? No, I think it would be my fault to not turn it the fuck off and control that shit myself, ain't nobody got time for that. Teslas do this alot. A person was also killed in my state by an inept driver letting the car drive itself, the car didn't detect a woman walking her bike across the road at night and killed her.

Tech isn't fool proof and actual human operation is and will always be needed. I'm surprised Airbus doesn't have as many crashes since they're more tech heavy especially with Fly By Wire systems and modules modules modules. Humans defeating those systems would be hard.
The loss of such tremendous amounts of life is tragic, nonetheless.

I'll just stick to vehicles with analog inputs, thank you very much.

[saner]

(03-23-2019 09:35 AM)Aurini Wrote:  

I'll just stick to vehicles with analog inputs, thank you very much.

I would like to too. Unfortunately they will almost certainly be mandated off the road to make way for V2V so the Wall-E types can abandon one more skill.

[911]

(03-23-2019 08:18 AM)void Wrote:  

(03-23-2019 02:31 AM)Glaucon Wrote:  

People forget that software is written by humans. You would not believe how horribly buggy enterprise softwares are, and it is getting worse. They are going to need more and more admins and dev to keep things alive.

I will never sit in an "self driving" car, let alone a plane.

I assume self driving cars will be more aware of their environment and have better reaction time, than idiots using their smartphone while driving. (seeing it every fucking day)
The good thing about self driving cars is, that the manufacturers will have to rely on direct marketing to the end-customer. It is rather easy to set foot inside a specific car model, or not.

That's a pretty low bar there. The main problem with self-driving cars is that they aren't as reliable as a decent driver. Another problem is that they enable those kinds of idiot drivers to go full retard behind the wheel.

[void]

(03-23-2019 09:49 AM)911 Wrote:  

(03-23-2019 08:18 AM)void Wrote:  

(03-23-2019 02:31 AM)Glaucon Wrote:  

People forget that software is written by humans. You would not believe how horribly buggy enterprise softwares are, and it is getting worse. They are going to need more and more admins and dev to keep things alive.

I will never sit in an "self driving" car, let alone a plane.

I assume self driving cars will be more aware of their environment and have better reaction time, than idiots using their smartphone while driving. (seeing it every fucking day)
The good thing about self driving cars is, that the manufacturers will have to rely on direct marketing to the end-customer. It is rather easy to set foot inside a specific car model, or not.

That's a pretty low bar there. The main problem with self-driving cars is that they aren't as reliable as a decent driver. Another problem is that they enable those kinds of idiot drivers to go full retard behind the wheel.

What do you mean with reliable? Humans are more prone to error under stressful situations.
There are no SAE level 5 cars on the market yet, what TESLA advertised as "autopilot" wasn't SAE level 5.
There will come a time, where fully automated cars will produce less accidents than humans.
Your insurance will charge you extra, if you get behind the wheel.

https://www.lifetime-reliability.com/cms..._insights/

[Thersites]

The news about the MAX with MCAS reminds me of old blog post that is 6 six years old at this point. The post talks about human and robotic interaction. Here the link: When Humans and Robots Communicate

Key highlights from the post:

Quote:

Whatever happened in the case of Asiana Flight 214…and all opinions about what happened with the autothrottles must be regarded as only speculative at this point…there have been numerous cases–in aviation, in medical equipment, and in the maritime industry–in which an automated control system and its human users interacted in a way that either did or could have led to very malign results. In his book Taming HAL, Asaf Degani describes several such cases, and searches for general patterns and for approaches to minimize such occurrences in the future.

Degani discusses human interface problems that he has observed in common consumer devices such as clocks, TV remote controls, and VCRs, and goes into depth on several incidents involving safety-critical interface failures. Some of these were:

The airplane that broke the speed limit. This was another autothrottle-related incident, albeit one in which the consequences were much less severe than Asiana 214. The airplane was climbing to its initial assigned altitude of 11,000 feet, under an autopilot mode (Vertical Navigation) in which speed was calculated by the flight management system for optimum efficiency–in this case, 300 knots. Air traffic control then directed that the flight slow to 240 knots for separation from traffic ahead. The copilot dialed this number into the flight control panel,overriding the FMS-calculated number. At 11000 feet, the autopilot leveled the plane, switched itself into ALTITUDE HOLD mode, and maintained the 240 knot speed setting. Everything was fine.

The controller then directed a further climb to 14000 feet. The copilot re-engaged VERTICAL NAVIGATION MODE and put in the new altitude setting. The engines increased power, the nose pitched up, and the airplane began to climb. But just a little bit later, the captain observed that the airplane wasn’t only climbing–it was also speeding up, and had reached almost 300 knots, thereby violating an ATC speed restriction.

What happened here? Degani refers to events of this sort as “automation surprises.” The copilot was apparently thinking that the speed he had dialed in to override the flight management system would continue to be in force when he re-enabled the vertical navigation climb mode. But that wasn’t the way the system was actually designed. Selecting Vertical Navigation mode re-initialized the source of the airspeed command to be the FMS, which was still calling for a 300-knot Best Efficiency speed.

Degani says that the pilots were well trained and understood how the speed reference value actually worked…but that the unintuitive nature of the interface caused this knowledge to be effectively forgotten at the moment when the additional climb was requested. He draws an analogy with the user of a cordless phone, who picks up the ringing phone and pushes the TALK button..a seemingly-logical action that actually turns off the phone and disconnects whoever is calling.

Boeing charging extra for necessary components need to tell pilots about MCAS is example of poorly throughout human-robotic interface. Interesting food for thought as poor design interface and forethought has cause a lot of problems. Especially when complacency takes hold.

Quote:

But when people use an automated system on a regular basis, and find it reliable, it is easy for them to assume that it can always be counted on, and for the cross-checking to be omitted. Indeed, in some instances cross-checking many not be operationally feasible–is it really reasonable to expect that an anesthesiologist will notice that a blood pressure reading is NOT changing, if he has other duties that draw his attention away from the monitor?

To maximize the safety of human-machine integrated systems, it is essential (a) that the creators of this system consciously design the interface with to try and avoid “automation surprises,” (b) that the humans who will operate the system understand its functioning in depth, including the interaction between separate components (like the GPS system and the radar/map plotter) and the behavior of those modes which are likely to be used only on rare occasions, and © that cross-checking, wherever possible, should be conducted religiously.

[puckerman]

I know Vox probably isn't a well-respected source here. Still, do you all think this article is pretty good?

https://www.vox.com/business-and-finance...-explained

It sounds like the FAA under Obama kissed Boeing's ass big time. Of course, what President hasn't kissed their asses?

[Bienvenuto]

(04-01-2019 07:04 AM)puckerman Wrote:  

I know Vox probably isn't a well-respected source here. Still, do you all think this article is pretty good?

https://www.vox.com/business-and-finance...-explained

It sounds like the FAA under Obama kissed Boeing's ass big time. Of course, what President hasn't kissed their asses?

"The 737 MAX was briefly a topic of political controversy in the United States as foreign regulators grounded the planes, but President Donald Trump — after speaking personally to Boeing’s CEO — declined to follow. Many members of Congress (from both parties) called on him to reconsider, which he rather quickly did, pushing the whole topic off Washington’s front burner."

Trump was slower than other countries but he took a lot of criticism from Right wing press for weighing in with what he said about the crash.
He spoke to the CEO straight after that and then he instituted the ban pretty soon after that.

Thought he did alright.

[Jetset]

Behind the WSJ's paywall, this morning's news is that the Ethiopian pilots did perform the procedure to turn off the MCAS, which Boeing insisted would have saved both Ethiopian and Lion Air.

It didn't help, so the pilots restored power to it either without realizing what that they were doing or in a deliberate desperate bid to get some kind of control over it.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ethiopian-a...1554263276

Quote:

The pilots on Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 initially reacted to the emergency by shutting off power to electric motors driven by the automated system, these people said, but then appear to have re-engaged the system to cope with a persistent steep nose-down angle. It wasn’t immediately clear why the pilots turned the automated system back on instead of continuing to follow Boeing’s standard emergency checklist, but government and industry officials said the likely reason would have been because manual controls to raise the nose didn’t achieve the desired results.

After first cranking a manual wheel in the cockpit that controls the same movable surfaces on the plane’s tail that MCAS had affected, the pilots turned electric power back on, one of these people said. They began to use electric switches to try to raise the plane’s nose, according to these people. But the electric power also reactivated MCAS, allowing it to continue its strong downward commands, the people said.

[LowerCaseG]

The day after the crash there were reports from witnesses on the ground of the back of the plane on fire/smoking and debris falling out. Multiple witnesses. Wouldn't that seem to be a distinct and separate issue from the MCAS. None of that stuff has been brought up since the Black Box/Voice recorder was found. What's going on?

[jeffreyjerpp]

(04-03-2019 08:27 AM)Jetset Wrote:  

Behind the WSJ's paywall, this morning's news is that the Ethiopian pilots did perform the procedure to turn off the MCAS, which Boeing insisted would have saved both Ethiopian and Lion Air.

It didn't help, so the pilots restored power to it either without realizing what that they were doing or in a deliberate desperate bid to get some kind of control over it.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ethiopian-a...1554263276

Quote:

The pilots on Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 initially reacted to the emergency by shutting off power to electric motors driven by the automated system, these people said, but then appear to have re-engaged the system to cope with a persistent steep nose-down angle. It wasn’t immediately clear why the pilots turned the automated system back on instead of continuing to follow Boeing’s standard emergency checklist, but government and industry officials said the likely reason would have been because manual controls to raise the nose didn’t achieve the desired results.

After first cranking a manual wheel in the cockpit that controls the same movable surfaces on the plane’s tail that MCAS had affected, the pilots turned electric power back on, one of these people said. They began to use electric switches to try to raise the plane’s nose, according to these people. But the electric power also reactivated MCAS, allowing it to continue its strong downward commands, the people said.

Shit....if this is case, Boeing is in a LOT of trouble. Like, a LOT.

[jeffreyjerpp]

Indeed, the software re-engaged even after the pilots tried to shut it off:

"Reuters, which was also the recipient of leaks from investigators, offered a slightly different version of events. It reported that MCAS was reengaged four times as pilots scrambled to right the plane, and that investigators were looking into the possibility that the software might have reengaged without prompting from the pilots."

zerohedge.com/news/2019-04-03/bad-news-boeing-preliminary-report-shows-anti-stall-software-sealed-flight-et302s

The outlook for Boeing ranges from bad to worse.

[Spectrumwalker]

(03-22-2019 02:54 PM)Duke Main Wrote:  

A) Not IQ, but experience and training.

Hey Duke, I was talking to someone recently, a private pilot, who has a friend who's a commercial pilot. I guess the commercial pilot had told him once that a lot of the Asian airlines send their pilots to flight schools in the US where all they need is 200 hours to qualify as a first officer. That's insane. Is that true? In the USA I guess 1500 hours is needed to even be granted an interview for first officer. And in Asia where respect for authority is so serious if something goes wrong no way a first officer is going to question the captain if he's even obviously fucking up. That just sounds like a recipe for disaster. If that's true, hell with ever flying Asian airlines. No offense to Asians, but damn. I've seen Asian drivers..and then to think about airlines...that's some scary shit.

[puckerman]

This all seems like a warning about self-driving cars. We will have instances in which drivers try to override the autopilot and won't be able to override it. We will have instances in which the autopilot just takes over for no reason whatsoever.

I have very little optimism about self-driving cars. I see them as a recipe for disaster.

[Jetset]

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019...ification/

Quote:

According to the whistleblowers cited by Wicker, some of the inspectors that had not been properly trained or certified may have been participants in the Flight Standardization Board (FSB) for the 737 MAX—a body formed by the FAA’s AEG to determine pilot-training requirements to receive “type ratings” for the 737. The FSB’s report determined that 737 type-rated pilots required no additional training to fly the 737 MAX, and no additional documentation was added to the 737 MAX’s operations manual regarding the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).

Nice.

(04-03-2019 10:56 PM)puckerman Wrote:  

This all seems like a warning about self-driving cars. We will have instances in which drivers try to override the autopilot and won't be able to override it. We will have instances in which the autopilot just takes over for no reason whatsoever.

I have very little optimism about self-driving cars. I see them as a recipe for disaster.

As true as it is that crashes will happen where a skilled driver might have averted it, automation is one of the biggest reasons commercial aviation is as safe as it is. Flight has become dramatically less deadly since the 1970s.

https://theblogbyjavier.com/2019/01/02/a...18-update/



Every accident involving self-driving cars will receive hysterical media coverage, but overall, it will reduce costs related to fatalities and injuries, which means that, just like seat-belt regulations, it will happen because insurance companies are bigger power brokers than people realize. In fact, I'd be interested in seeing a chart like the above based solely on 737 MAX flights. I'd be unsurprised if it not only turns out to still be safer than driving the same distance, but that bringing motorists up to the safety of the 737 MAX would be one of the biggest life-saving innovations since mass vaccination.

With that said, there's a case to be made that this works so well in aviation because pilots are (supposed to be) trained in what, specifically, the automation on their aircraft is designed to do under various conditions. Most drivers are inattentive shitheels who can't be bothered to understand the lights on their dashboard to begin with and designing automation for them is an entirely different problem.

[saner]

(04-03-2019 10:56 PM)puckerman Wrote:  

This all seems like a warning about self-driving cars. We will have instances in which drivers try to override the autopilot and won't be able to override it. We will have instances in which the autopilot just takes over for no reason whatsoever.
I have very little optimism about self-driving cars. I see them as a recipe for disaster.

I see them as useless for 4-6 months a year. Here in Canada anywhere not-Vancouver, not-Victoria anyway.

At least two months a year, the road surface and all markings are invisible due to snow. At least four months a year, the sensors will be encrusted with dirt and ice making them unreliable or useless.

Since many roads around here are an endless chain of long sweepers notched out of the side of mountains, take over from a confused auto-pilot would have to be instantaneous or the car will be airborne until it hits the river at the bottom or (slightly better) impacting the cliff face. Assuming it lets you as you mentioned.

Also, does anyone enjoy being a passenger? I can't relax when another human is driving, never mind some beta version software. Bluescreen of death anyone?