[Duke Main]

(04-03-2019 10:32 PM)Spectrumwalker Wrote:  

(03-22-2019 02:54 PM)Duke Main Wrote:  

A) Not IQ, but experience and training.

Hey Duke, I was talking to someone recently, a private pilot, who has a friend who's a commercial pilot. I guess the commercial pilot had told him once that a lot of the Asian airlines send their pilots to flight schools in the US where all they need is 200 hours to qualify as a first officer. That's insane. Is that true? In the USA I guess 1500 hours is needed to even be granted an interview for first officer. And in Asia where respect for authority is so serious if something goes wrong no way a first officer is going to question the captain if he's even obviously fucking up. That just sounds like a recipe for disaster. If that's true, hell with ever flying Asian airlines. No offense to Asians, but damn. I've seen Asian drivers..and then to think about airlines...that's some scary shit.

I have a friend who used to fly for a Chinese airline, I forget which one, who said he would never fly as a passenger on any Asian airline other than Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacific and the big Japanese carriers. I don't think he'd argue with anything you wrote.

[nairobian]

This wasn't about IQ or even a Boeing design issue. Whenever a late model,what some call 4th generation airlinerA 320,330,777 etc etc with glass cockpits,FBW and the newest multiple in flight safety systems goes down always ask-who was flying? Who exactly were the passengers?
Both Lion Air and Ethio 320 had some pretty heavy hitters aboard. The Indo 737 had 20 Indonesian finance ministry guys going for a discussion on the Global Collateral Accounts;a very long story about trillions worth of ancient gold from SEA currently in the possession of those behind the petrodollar.
The Ethio 737 had 4 UN guys heading to Nairobi for a meeting on human/sex/organ trafficking behind the scenes of the ongoing Climate Change conference. I still can't post links but basically both planes were hacked from the ground.

[Handsome Creepy Eel]

Why can't you post links?

[Leonard D Neubache]

I'm honestly surprised that people aren't simply Skyping their testimony, cross examinations and public speaking events in general, especially if it's just for the benefit of a bunch of dried up suits at the UN.

When I hear that 30 dudes were on a plane to attend a UN summit on climate change I honestly think "yeah, you ridiculous fucks are really taking emissions very seriously to fly 3000 miles and attend your precious gatherings instead of just booting up your laptop and addressing these assholes from your living room."

Same goes for countries banning right wing speakers from entering. The identarians (or whoever) should just project Spencer or Pettibone or Southern onto a 50 foot screen at their venue. I'm pretty sure the dickheads at the state departments still have a hard time banning random Skype calls.

[nairobian]

(04-06-2019 05:39 AM)Handsome Creepy Eel Wrote:  

Why can't you post links?

Noobs can only post after 5 posts-let me try.

Quote:

Twenty Ministry of Finance employees,[12] 10 Audit Board of Indonesia employees

indo finance guys

Quote:

N staff killed on crashed Ethiopian AirlinesLosses
World Food Program7
UN Office in Nairobi6
High Commissioner on Refugees2
International Telecomms Union2
Food and Agriculture Organization1
Intl. Organization for Migration (Sudan)1
UN Assistance Mission in Somalia1

un guys

Also we can only post after 20 minutes!

[Belgrano]

A plane flying from Addis to Nairobi has a bunch of people who are working for international organisations and NGOs on board?

Unheard of!
There's just no other explanation.
It's a conspiracy for sure.

[SassySam]

Air travel is the safest way to travel...but that doesn't make you feel better when you realize you're the exception

[nairobian]

(04-06-2019 04:59 AM)nairobian Wrote:  

This wasn't about IQ or even a Boeing design issue. Whenever a late model,what some call 4th generation airlinerA 320,330,777 etc etc with glass cockpits,FBW and the newest multiple in flight safety systems goes down always ask-who was flying? Who exactly were the passengers?
Both Lion Air and Ethio 320 had some pretty heavy hitters aboard. The Indo 737 had 20 Indonesian finance ministry guys going for a discussion on the Global Collateral Accounts;a very long story about trillions worth of ancient gold from SEA currently in the possession of those behind the petrodollar.
The Ethio 737 had 4 UN guys heading to Nairobi for a meeting on human/sex/organ trafficking behind the scenes of the ongoing Climate Change conference. I still can't post links but basically both planes were hacked from the ground.

Now that I can post links I've realised I need some more background on evidence for the Indonesia Lion Air crash. As I said it was about trillions worth of ancient gold captured by the Japanese in WW2,recovered by those behind the petro dollars and demanded by its original owners, the SEA royalty.
Fyi,all Asian temples from India to the SE and NE were depositories of treasure. Here's a recent find in India:

Quote:

In Southern India a story that sounds like the plot line of a Hollywood adventure is unfolding. Over the past week, on orders from the country's Supreme Court, a panel has found a treasure estimated to be worth $22 billion in the underground vaults of a Hindu temple in Trivandrum, India.

http://https://www.npr.org/sections/thet...ian-temple

As you can see NPR is as MSM as can be. The IJA captured Hindu,Buddhist and Confucian temples throughout their territory so you can imagine their stupendous haul.

Quote:

The “official” total for the entire amount of gold said to be above ground since humanity first began mining the precious metal is approximately 160,000 metric tons. Evidence now indicates that a more accurate figure is well in excess of two million metric tons. During World War Two, the Japanese dug tunnels and bunkers throughout Southeast Asia to store the gold – primarily in Indonesia, Thailand, and The Phillipines. After the war, the gold was discovered by the Allies, and was incorporated into a system set up by the European central bankers before the war for this very purpose.

http://https://geopolitics.co/2013/06/09...-accounts/

Its a very long story but Indonesia plays a central role:

Quote:

In the late 1940’s, President Sukarno of Indonesia was appointed monetary controller of behalf of the depositors to monitor and implement the Global Accounts for redevelopment purposes.

So when a 737 carrying Indonesian finance ministry guys discussing the return of the gold crashes,call me a conspiracy theorist but I don't believe it was "low IQ induced" pilot error

[Handsome Creepy Eel]

Plot twist: MCAS is a CIA-developed "upgrade" that allows (((certain people))) to discreetly assassinate anyone.

[swuglyfe]

(04-09-2019 11:04 AM)Handsome Creepy Eel Wrote:  

Plot twist: MCAS is a CIA-developed "upgrade" that allows (((certain people))) to discreetly assassinate anyone.

I've seen this one a couple of times now. I'm discounting it mostly on the fact that you'd only get one or two real good cracks at it before people get so afraid of flying the entire plane that it stops being effective. Already NPC retards are freaking out that the Southwest safety card has both 737-800 and 737 MAX 8 printed on it because of commonality, thinking they're flying the crashing one.

https://viewfromthewing.boardingarea.com...ngers-out/

Sure a plane crash is convenient, but it's WAY less effort to Seth Rich a guy than infiltrate a plane manufacturer and slip in malicious software to "correct" for a decade in the making (deliberate??) design deficiency to possibly have the target fly that exact plane on an airline which has the plane.

[Jetset]

Angle I didn't consider, as jilted stockholders bring a class-action securities fraud lawsuit against Boeing:

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethio...SKCN1RL31D

[jcrew247]

I really hope they don't let the MAX fly again and keep it permanently grounded. Heck, even Ralph Nadar's niece died in Ethiopia crash and he's going to get involved in the lawsuits and PR campaign against Boeing/FAA. I don't really think the software patches are going to do any good. They say the MCAS will only trigger once but is that really going to work. Generally software is created on a loop and must adhere to sensor readings. If the faulty sensor keeps giving out bad information, the loop will continue to trigger the MCAS dive. There will be no way to disable a faulty sensor during flight. Then you have the Ethiopioa crash were they turned off MCAS but could not fix the flaps with human force. Its just another disaster waiting to happen again.
I really think Beoing needs to scrap the Max and just launch a new plane even if it takes 5 years. They will have to scrap the max for tax-credits or sell them to Fedex. I don't think passengers in Asia or Africa are going to want to fly in a Max any time soon and those countries won't greenlight the Max again. SW will probably take the Max for a deep discount but I just don't think Americans will want to fly in them. Boeing will need to sell themselves off because they will not be profitable with all the lawsuits and Max inventory.

[BlueMark]

Software patch will not fix the problem because software is exceedingly hard to get right. And the software engineering culture at an old school company like Boeing is nowhere near the level of top tech companies. That means the latter end up hoarding all the good talent.

This is not the first time that Boeing has dropped the ball on its software. The 787 Dreamliner has a bug that requires the computer to be reset every 8 months, or the electrical system will fail:
https://www.engadget.com/2015/05/01/boei...tware-bug/

The problem was that they used a 32-bit instead of 64-bit number to represent time. That wasn't big enough. This was such a novice mistake on Boeing's part, which is why we should be skeptical of any software solutions they create to solve hardware problems.

[Jetset]

Old and Busted:

(03-13-2019 10:15 AM)Jetset Wrote:  

A possible factor is that Addis Ababa is a mile and a half above sea level.

Think about two summers ago when Phoenix airport was shut down because it was so hot, the pilots didn't have lifting tables prepared to determine the necessary airspeed to safely take off when the air was that thin. It's not an insurmountable problem, but my recollection is that it was an insurmountable problem that day because they just didn't have proven numbers, and so couldn't run through their mandatory checklists.

It turns out there's aviation lingo for this: some airports are so-called "hot and high", and ADD and PHX are both listed as well-known examples on Wikipedia. In the old days, when aircraft were heavier, this was enough of a problem that they built special airliners intended for these airports. Boeing even sold a short-lived 727 variant with a rocket booster pack designed for Mexicana, so they could safely take off with a full payload out of Mexico City (roughly the same altitude as Addis Ababa). The rockets would fire if an engine failed past the point-of-no-return, so that the pilot could pick up enough speed to regain control.

New Hotness:

Quote:

Before last month’s crash of a flight that began in Ethiopia, Boeing Co. said in a legal document that large, upgraded 737s “cannot be used at what are referred to as ‘high/hot’ airports."

Boeing stated in a brief filed in the trade case that the “737 Max 7 has greater performance capabilities at challenging airports. In particular, the 737 Max 7 can serve certain ‘high/hot’ airports and has a greater range operating out of constrained airfields.” The brief then cites a number of such airports -- the names of which are redacted -- that the Max 7 can fly that “the 8, 9 and 10 cannot."

Asked during a trade commission hearing to specify which airports, an expert witness for Boeing replied that “sometimes Denver would qualify as that.” The expert, Jerry Nickelsburg, an adjunct economics professor at UCLA, added that “Mexico City certainly qualifies as that.”

Denver’s airport is more than 2,000 feet lower than Addis and has five runways that measure 12,000 feet and one that is 16,000 feet (or 4,800 meters). The airport in Mexico City is 300 feet lower than Addis and has four runways that are 13,000 feet (or about 4,000 meters) and two that are 15,000 feet (or about 4,600 meters). Aeromexico flies the Max 8 as part of its fleet.

Hot airfields such as the Jakarta airport, from where the doomed Lion Air plane took off last October, produce similar air densities as high elevations, requiring faster takeoff speeds.

One implication is that the dramatic takeoff speed required to get off the ground at all may have been a contributing factor in the Ethiopian crew's inability to get control over the flight surfaces after shutting off power to the MCAS.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/...n-airports

[Jetset]

http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/04/w...light.html

This provides a ton of clarity, especially to what I had raised before about struggling with energy loss during that heavy right turn back to ADD and the possibility that this caused a malfunctioning MCAS to read their low speed as being in danger of stalling.

Quote:

8:40:35 a.m.: “Stab trim cut-out!” the first officer says — that is, the electrical trim system for the stabilizer must be disconnected. “Stab trim cut out!” The captain agrees. They recognize that they are experiencing a runway MCAS, a condition that destroyed Lion Air Flight 610 less than five months before. They flip a pair of switches that disables the trim system, and along with it the MCAS.

8:41:46 a.m.: The pilots have made a mistake that is easy to overlook amid the confusion, but which will have severe consequences. When they shut off the electric trim system to disable MCAS, they also shut off their ability to use the electric switch on the top of their yokes to trim the stabilizer back into a neutral position. The only way they can move it now is by cranking the wheel by hand. But because the stabilizer is positioned opposite to the elevator, there are strong aerodynamic forces pushing on it, effectively pinning it in place. The problem is made worse by another inadvertent mistake the pilots have made: They’ve left the engines at full takeoff power, which has caused the plane to accelerate to high speed. This adds to the pressure on the stabilizer. Try as they might to crank the stabilizer back into position by hand, the pilots can’t get it to budge.

8:42:10 a.m.: The captain asks the co-pilot to called air traffic control and ask them for permission to return to the airport. The co-pilot does this and permission is granted. Following ATC’s instructions, they turn the plane to the east. The plane makes a wobbly roll to the right, the wings quivering as it dips and rises in relation to the horizon. Soon the right wing is pointed sharply down as the plane’s turn steepens.

8:43:04 a.m.: For minutes now, the captain has been using brute physical force to pull the control yoke back in order to keep the plane’s nose from sinking. Now he asks the first officer to help him. It’s exhausting work, and they can’t keep it up forever. Because the engines remain at full power, the plane is flying right at the top end of its design speed. Any faster, and it risks getting torn apart.

It’s terrifying for a pilot to struggle to control his airplane, and the surge of intense fear makes it impossible to think creatively, an effect psychologists call “cognitive tunneling.” Failing to grasp that he should reduce engine power, and unable to think of any good way to get the stabilizer back into trim, the captain apparently settles on a desperate gambit: He will turn the electrical trim system back on, and hope that the system will allow him to put the stabilizer back in neutral trim.

8:43:11 a.m.: The captain briefly toggles the manual switch to trim the nose up, then toggles it again. He is tentative, as if testing to see how big an effect the move will have given the plane’s extremely high speed.

8:43:20 a.m.: The demon awakened by the restoration of electric trim reappears. MCAS kicks back in, pushing nose steeply down. There’s no reason for the system to deploy at this speed — it was added to the 737 Max to prevent unintended stalling at low speed, hardly a danger with the plane at the high end of its speed envelope — but its designers apparently failed to consider that this kind of situation might arise.

The captain and first officer pull back on their yokes with all their strength, but the nose plunges lower and lower, until they’re barreling toward the ground like a roller-coaster. The men are left hanging in their straps as the indicated airspeed blasts through its design envelope.

Instead, it sounds like they powered straight into the Earth at 700 miles an hour.

[CaptainChardonnay]

[MidJack]

Even this is not a correct explanation. This is so damn tiring. It's like every journalist/propagandist out there thinks they are now a pilot or aircraft engineer.

The description of the event at 8:43:20 a.m is fundamentally wrong.

The MCAS system did not "kick back in" when power was restored to the trim motors. MCAS was never off. The pilots could not turn it off. MCAS was still issuing commands to the motors, but the motors did not move the control surface because the pilots had cut electrical power to the motors, but not MCAS, probably because it is embedded in the flight computer.

Then the pilots could not move the control surface with the mechanical trim wheel because their airspeed (supposedly) made it impossible. The aircraft was so far out of trim that regular yoke inputs did not provide enough authority to keep the nose up.

The essential flaw in Boeing's system was the MCAS could not be defeated by the pilots, and the pilots' mistake was keeping airspeed too high and then reconnecting power to the trim motors.

They tried to override MCAS's commands using their trim switches, which are otherwise totally routine in use, but instead MCAS had more authority over the aircraft than they did.

Then the computer put the aircraft in the ground.

(04-11-2019 06:53 PM)Jetset Wrote:  

http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/04/w...light.html

This provides a ton of clarity, especially to what I had raised before about struggling with energy loss during that heavy right turn back to ADD and the possibility that this caused a malfunctioning MCAS to read their low speed as being in danger of stalling.

Quote:

8:40:35 a.m.: “Stab trim cut-out!” the first officer says — that is, the electrical trim system for the stabilizer must be disconnected. “Stab trim cut out!” The captain agrees. They recognize that they are experiencing a runway MCAS, a condition that destroyed Lion Air Flight 610 less than five months before. They flip a pair of switches that disables the trim system, and along with it the MCAS.

8:41:46 a.m.: The pilots have made a mistake that is easy to overlook amid the confusion, but which will have severe consequences. When they shut off the electric trim system to disable MCAS, they also shut off their ability to use the electric switch on the top of their yokes to trim the stabilizer back into a neutral position. The only way they can move it now is by cranking the wheel by hand. But because the stabilizer is positioned opposite to the elevator, there are strong aerodynamic forces pushing on it, effectively pinning it in place. The problem is made worse by another inadvertent mistake the pilots have made: They’ve left the engines at full takeoff power, which has caused the plane to accelerate to high speed. This adds to the pressure on the stabilizer. Try as they might to crank the stabilizer back into position by hand, the pilots can’t get it to budge.

8:42:10 a.m.: The captain asks the co-pilot to called air traffic control and ask them for permission to return to the airport. The co-pilot does this and permission is granted. Following ATC’s instructions, they turn the plane to the east. The plane makes a wobbly roll to the right, the wings quivering as it dips and rises in relation to the horizon. Soon the right wing is pointed sharply down as the plane’s turn steepens.

8:43:04 a.m.: For minutes now, the captain has been using brute physical force to pull the control yoke back in order to keep the plane’s nose from sinking. Now he asks the first officer to help him. It’s exhausting work, and they can’t keep it up forever. Because the engines remain at full power, the plane is flying right at the top end of its design speed. Any faster, and it risks getting torn apart.

It’s terrifying for a pilot to struggle to control his airplane, and the surge of intense fear makes it impossible to think creatively, an effect psychologists call “cognitive tunneling.” Failing to grasp that he should reduce engine power, and unable to think of any good way to get the stabilizer back into trim, the captain apparently settles on a desperate gambit: He will turn the electrical trim system back on, and hope that the system will allow him to put the stabilizer back in neutral trim.

8:43:11 a.m.: The captain briefly toggles the manual switch to trim the nose up, then toggles it again. He is tentative, as if testing to see how big an effect the move will have given the plane’s extremely high speed.

8:43:20 a.m.: The demon awakened by the restoration of electric trim reappears. MCAS kicks back in, pushing nose steeply down. There’s no reason for the system to deploy at this speed — it was added to the 737 Max to prevent unintended stalling at low speed, hardly a danger with the plane at the high end of its speed envelope — but its designers apparently failed to consider that this kind of situation might arise.

The captain and first officer pull back on their yokes with all their strength, but the nose plunges lower and lower, until they’re barreling toward the ground like a roller-coaster. The men are left hanging in their straps as the indicated airspeed blasts through its design envelope.

Instead, it sounds like they powered straight into the Earth at 700 miles an hour.

[saner]

A fairly long explanation of the fall of Boeing and how it started long before the 737max.

http://www.cuzzblue.com/2019/04/how-boei...atest.html

-------
But the Seattle Times also exposed that the rot took hold well before the 787 debacle, citing an internal Boeing Report, written in 2001 by Dr. L.J. Hart-Smith, a mere five years after the merger was consummated. Hart-Smith described the disastrous economic effects of excessive outsourcing that began to afflict Boeing almost immediately, especially as its ties to the military expanded. These problems are elaborated here by longtime defense analysts Franklin “Chuck” Spinney and Pierre Sprey:
-------

[Jetset]

Apparently, there's leaked audio of American Airlines pilots angrily confronting Boeing prior to this crash and being promised the software fix quickly, and the union was so annoyed they'd started filing Freedom of Information Act requests trying to figure out what was going on:

https://www.dallasnews.com/business/airl...aa-records

There is also a report substantiating what I said before, that China has had the 737 Max in their sights for a while, attempting to swap approval of the 737 Max for favorable trade treatment of their own aircraft:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/...s-own-jets

Boeing stock hasn't recovered since the accident, and in fact slid further, below $350/share from $422/share before the crash.